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GROWING EVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE suggests that knowledge is represented 
via a network in cognition (Hudson 2001: 1).  This has led to a re-analysis of the 
modular view of language in the mind (Chomsky 1986).  Consequently, many 
cognitive linguists now propose that linguistic knowledge is organised in the mind in 
the same way as other, more general aspects of cognition (see e.g. Langacker 1987; 
Goldberg 1995: 5).  This proposal has enormous consequences for linguistics because 
it blurs many of the distinctions that were traditionally made in linguistic theory. For 
example, it implies that cognitive linguistic theories no longer recognise a clear 
dichotomy between linguistic and non-linguistic concepts.  Social, cultural and 
linguistic knowledge are thought to be unavoidably entwined in cognition (Langacker 
1994: 31-33).   Therefore, theories that come under the cognitive linguistics umbrella
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claim not to deny the importance of the social aspects of language use; they claim not 
to treat social influences on language as secondary or less important.  
 However, cognitive linguists have given little consideration to the ways in which a 
network model of cognition can incorporate the enormous amounts of research that 
have been generated in the field of sociolinguistics.  Furthermore, sociolinguists have 
paid little attention to the rapidly expanding theories of cognitive linguistics, despite 
often facing criticisms that sociolinguistics is a mainly empirical subject that lacks 
any central theory (e.g. see Spolsky 1997:7-8; Chomsky 1979: 57).    
 This paper will begin to bridge this gap by highlighting one apparent area of 
crossover between the disciplines of cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics: their 
respective treatment of networks.  By exploring the links between a cognitive network 
model and a social network model, this paper demonstrates that there are, in fact, 
some remarkable similarities between both frameworks.  Moreover, the proposed 
explanation for these similarities is that social networks may, in fact, exist in the mind 
of the individual.  If this is the case, then social networks must exist as part of the 
larger cognitive network.  
The paper is organised in four parts.  Section one exemplifies how variation in 
sociophonetic data can be represented in a cognitive network model.  Section two 
examines the social network structure of the group of speakers from which the data 
were obtained and highlights the parallels that exist between the social network model 
and the cognitive network model.  Section three explores the possibility that social 
networks exist in the mind of the individual and section four is a discussion of the 
implications of this approach. 
 
1.  T-GLOTTALING:  DATA AND METHODS.  The data that follow were collected over a 
12-month period using the ethnographic method of long-term participant observation 
(Eckert 2000)
3
.  The 16 adolescent subjects in this study form a community of 
practice (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992); they play together in a juvenile pipe band 
in Fife, Scotland.  The subjects range between 12-18 years old and, with the exception 
of one informant (Kath), who is middle class; the socioeconomic backgrounds of the 
speakers are roughly upper-working class
4
.   
The present discussion concerns the patterning of the (t) variable in the group
5
. 
T-glottaling, the realization of  with a glottal stop (Wells 1982:261), is now a well-
established feature of Modern Scots (Stuart-Smith 2003:125).  The actuation of this 
change is unknown, although its presence was noted in the west of Scotland as early 
as 1860 (Bell 1860:137).  T-glottaling is often considered a stereotype of Glasgow 
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speech (Stuart-Smith 2003:125).  However, there is evidence to suggest that it has 
also been a characteristic feature of the Fife dialect since the early 20
th
 Century: “The 
glottal catch in place of t between two vowels e.g. in butter, water, is rarely heard in 
Lothian but is common in Fife” (Wilson 1926:17; cited in Jones 1997:329).  The 
present analysis of t-glottaling is based on auditory transcriptions
6
 of six hours of 
conversation.  Following Moore (2003: 43), the speakers were recorded conversing 
with the researcher (myself) in small, self-selected groups of friends. Although this is 
a relatively small corpus in terms of recording time, the actual number of instances of 
the (t) variable is substantial. 14,980 tokens were collected in total from the group, an 
average of 936 tokens per speaker.    
 
Figure 1 is a summary of each informant’s percentage use of the variants of 
(t). 
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Figure 1.  Percentage use of the variants of (t).  
 
The three phonetic variants of (t) in the data are: 
 
 1.  a released stop 
 2.  a glottal stop   
 3.  a central approximant
7
 .  
 
The striking pattern in Figure 1 is the minimal amount of variability.  All 
speakers are using between 90-100% of the glottal variant. In order to explain the 
variation that does exist in the data, however, it is necessary to examine the patterning 
of this variable for a single individual in the group.  As Schilling-Estes (2002:  376) 
explains, “we cannot hope to achieve a full understanding of the patterning of 
variation in language … if we do not understand its patterning within individuals’ 
speech."  
 



N=14,980 
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1.2.  NETWORKS IN COGNITION.  The cognitive network model I adopt to explain 
aspects of this variation is Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (hereafter CG, Langacker 
1987, 1991), although the arguments I make are not specific to CG and are applicable 
to other cognitive linguistic theories. 
In CG, the variation in (t) can be represented in the mind of the individual as a 
series of categorisation relationships between a schema and its instances.  This is 
diagrammed in Figure 2.  
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 Figure 2.  Schematic representation of the variation in (t) for Greg. 
 
Figure 2 displays the values of linguistic variation from Greg’s recording as a 
schematic network.  ‘Schema’ is the CG term given to a more abstract representation 
in cognition which is specified in greater detail by an ‘instance’ (Langacker 1987:68).  
Schemas emerge in cognition through abstractions over instances (Langacker 
1987:69). Speakers create schemas by abstracting over expressions and recognising 
some commonality between different instances; different instances then elaborate the 
schema in different ways.   
Trousdale (2002:272) examines t-glottaling in eight possible phonetic 
environments (four word medial environments and four word final environments, 
which differ, depending on the quality of the following segment in the sequence).  
However, this speaker did not appear to be influenced, in his selection of variants, by 
the quality of the following segment, which suggests that he has not abstracted a level 
of commonality (or a schema) that relates specifically to the immediate phonetic 
environment of the instance.  He did differ slightly in his selection of variants 
depending on the position of the segment in the word
8
.  Therefore, the data in this 
study have been divided into only two environments (word medial (t) and word final 
(t)), which are represented in the network as lower-level schemas, i.e. more fleshed-
out characterisations of the higher-level, more general (t) schema.  
In each utterance, the speaker has a choice between three different variants in 
the schema.  One factor that influences this choice is the degree of entrenchment of 
the variant in the speaker’s cognitive network.   In CG, the nodes of a network are 
described as having various degrees of entrenchment (Langacker 1987: 59).  The 
occurrence of any type of mental activity will leave behind a neurological trace.  If 
this event (or, more accurately, event type) recurs, it becomes more and more 
entrenched in the mind of the speaker through repetition.  Event types achieve unit 
Word final (t) Word medial (t) 
     
94.6%      2.8%      2.6%  94%      6% 
() 
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status in CG when automization occurs and the speaker can activate the structure 
largely automatically (Langacker 1987: 60).  The more a particular node is 
successfully activated, the more entrenched the node becomes, which in turn leads to 
a greater probability that the node will be selected in another usage event. If we 
equate entrenchment in CG with frequency of successful use, we can therefore 
assume that the glottal articulation is very heavily entrenched in Greg’s cognitive 
network (marked in Figure 2 with a heavy box).   
Although this speaker uses the glottal variant around 95% of the time, it seems 
that some words have a greater likelihood of being realised with a particular variant 
than others.  For example, in the word final schema, that (which accounts for 71 
tokens) and it (which accounts for 70 tokens) are only ever realised with the glottal 
variant in this usage event.  Typically these words appear in a reduced-stress 
environment, which could perhaps explain why the glottal articulation is more likely
9
, 
but so too do words like got, get and pit which vary for this speaker.  With a closer 
examination of the variation in these particular words a pattern emerges.  It seems that 
word final [t] is more likely to be selected in a monosyllabic word where the 
following word is it, e.g. get it or pit it.  The consonant at the end of the first word in 
these examples is often realised as an alveolar stop but the consonant at the end of the 
second word is realised as a glottal stop.  Taylor (2002:258) suggests that certain high 
frequency word combinations or constructions can become so entrenched that they are 
stored in cognition and retrieved as whole units.  In other words, these high frequency 
combinations can be accessed directly, rather than via the activation of a schema.  It is 
therefore possible that this speaker has stored these constructions in the same way, 
with the alveolar articulation first in the sequence.   
It is also possible that this speaker has extracted another lower-level schema to 
encompass instances that occur in the context [monosyllabic word  ## ],  
creating a situation of schema competition, which arises when two or more 
incompatible schemas are candidates for the categorisation of an instance (Taylor 
2002: 301). The conditions for glottal selection in the (t) schema are massively 
underspecified because there are very few phonetic restrictions on where it can occur 
(see note 7).  This means that the elaborative distance (i.e. the degree to which the 
schema is underspecified in relation to the instance) between the schema and the 
instance is great.  However, if a schema has been extracted to encompass all instances 
of the [t] variant word-finally before it, the elaborative distance between this lower-
level schema and the instance is much less, because this is a very specific phonetic 
environment.  In the case of schema competition, "the schema with the shortest 
elaborative distance wins out" (Taylor 2002: 302), and so the lower-level schema 
associated with [t] selection is capable of overriding the very strong entrenchment 
associated with the glottal articulation in the higher level schema. This pattern of 
word final [t] before it is not confined to the speech of this individual; it was noticed 
in the data for other individuals in the group and has been commented on in other 
studies of t-glottaling, e.g. Stuart-Smith (1999:194), Macaulay (1991:35-36) and 
Trudgill (1999:132), adding further weight to the proposal that speakers recognise 
some commonality between these instances and hence may form lower-level schemas 
to deal with the perceived similarity.   
  However, although entrenchment in the schematic network is a useful tool in 
understanding linguistic variation, it does not account for the social meaning that 
speakers associate with these variants.  The majority of instances of [t] for this 
speaker were motivated by a clear shift in style.  For example, throughout this 
recording, Greg and his taping partner Rob had several mock fights and after each 
one, they proceeded to recite the details of the fight to the tape in a news reader or 
commentator style, usually beginning ‘for the benefit of the tape…’ (see example 1).  
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(1) 
G: by the way ma knuckles actually sair 
R: [laughing] so’s ma fucking heid.  [commentator style] For the benefit of the 
tape, Greg has once again 
G: [commentator style] assaulted Rob 
R: yes 
G: [commentator style] in an vicious and…provoked manner 
R: provoked? 
G: [commentator style] yes. You, like, make comments about my mother… 
       
It is clear from example 1 that, for these speakers, commentator style is 
characterised, not only by the use of (t): [t] but by the selection of a more standard 
register generally, e.g. note the use of yes rather than Scots aye; mother rather than 
Scots maw [	
] or mer [	].  Israel & Kemmer (1994: 174) argue that “particular 
forms or whole classes of forms may become stereotypically associated with the sorts 
of speech act situations in which they are most commonly experienced.”  It therefore 
seems reasonable to suggest that, through the repeated co-activation of particular 
linguistic nodes in particular social contexts, these speakers have come to associate 
the glottal articulation with a default or informal style of speech, and the alveolar 
articulation with a style typical of commentators.  Therefore, although the glottal 
articulation is very heavily entrenched in the speaker’s cognitive network, 
entrenchment is not the only factor influencing the choice of this particular variant.  
When this speaker switches to another speech style that he associates with the [t] 
articulation in his cognitive network, he is capable of overriding the heavy 
entrenchment of the glottal stop and selecting the [t] variant. 
Thus phonological variation in linguistic data can at least be modelled in a 
cognitive network and both social factors (e.g. style shifting) and linguistic factors 
(e.g. schema extraction and entrenchment) influencing the variation can be 
accommodated in the same theoretical framework.   
 
2.  SOCIAL NETWORKS.  A substantial body of research has been carried out in recent 
years on the assumption that networks also exist in society.  Milroy (2002:  549) 
defines social networks as “the aggregate of relationships contracted with others”.  
Social Networks are often described in terms of density and multiplexity, where 
density relates to the number of ties (or links) between individuals in a network and 
plexity relates to the nature of these ties.  A maximally dense, multiplex network is 
therefore one in which all members of the network know each other and they all know 
each other in more than one capacity.   
However, a typical social network analysis does not simply describe the links 
between individuals in a group in terms of density and multiplexity, it also attempts to 
quantify these relationships in some way.   Milroy (1980:  141-42) measured the 
network strength of individuals by placing them on a six-point scale according to five 
factors relating to their position in the immediate neighbourhood.  This method of 
quantification was inappropriate for the adolescents in this sample because they do 
not form a territorially based cluster in the neighbourhood in the way that Milroy’s 
subjects did. Following Cheshire (1982), I therefore based the social network analysis 
of this group solely on measurements of friendship links.  Figure 3 is a sociogram 
displaying the positive and negative relationships that the informants felt existed 
among them.   Negative links (or dislike links) are represented with thin lines, positive 
links (or friendship links) are represented with thicker lines and reciprocal friendship 
links are represented with very thick lines.  The network analysis was performed by 
 6 
UCINET 6.79 and diagrammed using NETDRAW (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 
1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Social Relationships in the West Fife High School Pipe Band 
 
By comparing the social network model of Figure 3 with the description of the 
cognitive network model presented in section 1, we can see that there are some clear 
parallels between the two models.  The relationships between nodes of the cognitive 
network and speakers in the social network model are described in terms of a series of 
ties or links.  The ties in the social network can vary in entrenchment (or multiplexity) 
as can the links between nodes in cognition, and the nodes themselves can also vary in 
entrenchment in the cognitive network model as can the degree of familiarity with any 
given speaker in the social network. 
 Of course, simply comparing any two network models, particularly bounded 
networks such as those described above, is likely to produce similarities.  The reason I 
propose that these networks are similar stems more from some of the problems that 
have been recognised with the social network approach, particularly with the 
assumption that social relationships between individuals can be accurately quantified.  
Milroy’s (2002:  550) approach to SNA distinguished between strong ties (i.e. kin or 
close friends) and weak ties (i.e. ties with acquaintances). Yet it is unclear, for 
instance, how speakers (or analysts) distinguish a friendship tie from an acquaintance 
tie. Do all speakers make this distinction at the same level of acquaintance?  How 
does the analyst deal with kin ties that mean little to the speaker or where the 
interaction is infrequent?  It seems that describing social relationships as categorically 
strong or weak is a huge simplification.  Social relationships are not binary; they are 
gradient, dynamic and often very complex.   
The main problem with previous attempts to quantify social ties stems from a 
failure to recognise the true nature of these ties.  Ties in a social network symbolise 
social relationships, but these relationships only exist because individuals perceive 
them to exist.  If this is the case, then social relationships must only exist in cognition.  
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When analysts assign a value of strength to a social network tie, it therefore has to be 
acknowledged that they are actually assigning a value to links in a cognitive network, 
and this is not easily quantifiable.   
I therefore suggest that social networks and cognitive networks are not only 
similar network models; they may, in fact, be exactly the same cognitive structures.  If 
social networks are simply another sub-network of knowledge, then they are 
ultimately linked to other aspects of knowledge, some of which is more ‘linguistic’. 
But because the theory does not recognise a clear dichotomy between linguistic and 
non-linguistic concepts, there is no need to separate linguistic and non-linguistic 
nodes in this model. 
 This section highlights some of the ways in which data from this group of 
adolescents can also be modelled in a social network and draws parallels between 
social and cognitive networks. 
 
3.  SOCIAL SPACE.  Despite these parallels, clear differences remain between the 
models.  The main difference is that the cognitive network model discussed in section 
1 represents an individual speaker’s knowledge but the picture of the network that is 
presented in a social network analysis or a sociogram (as in Figure 3) does not 
correspond with the mental representation of any one individual.  If it is indeed the 
case (as a usage-based model of cognition like CG suggests) that knowledge is based 
on previous experience, then no two individuals will share exactly the same mental 
representation of this social network, as no two individuals will have had exactly the 
same experiences of the network.  Therefore the networks that speakers perceive to 
exist cannot be accurately mapped by sociograms.  Social networks are difficult to 
measure objectively and we do not get a full understanding of what these relationships 
actually mean to individuals in a given community.  Milroy (2002:  556) claims that 
SNA is a “participant rather than an analyst concept,” but this sociogram is an 
abstraction over all of the viewpoints of individuals in the network.  It is far removed 
from reality; it can only exist as an analyst’s construct.   Of course, individuals 
perceive the existence of social relationships; but such relationships exist in the minds 
of these individuals, so we need a model of social cognition that focuses on the 
individual’s conception of the network. The model I propose draws on the cognitive 
theory of Mental Space (Fauconnier 1994 [1985]). 
 Mental spaces have been defined as “partial assemblies constructed as we think 
and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action” (Fauconnier 2005: 1). They 
are high-level cognitive structures that operate in the ‘cognitive background’ of 
speech production and processing, typically below the level of conscious awareness 
(Fauconnier 1994: xvii), and they are invoked and stored in working memory as 
discourse unfolds. Mental spaces should not be considered as an alternative to the 
network model.  According to Fauconnier (2005:  2), they are sets of "activated 
neuronal assemblies". In other words, they are pockets of active nodes in the network.  
connected by various types of ‘mapping’ (or linking) devices which ultimately shape 
into large-scale conceptual networks.   
 Fauconnier & Turner (1998:134) argue that mental space construction is one of the 
basic cognitive operations of the human mind.  But if we are not consciously aware of 
forming these structures, how can we be sure of their existence?  Fauconnier & 
Turner (1998) argue that mental spaces are not only psychologically plausible,  they 
are necessary in order to explain our human ability to imagine and to construct mental 
models that do not (indeed cannot) have direct referents in the physical world.  They 
can also explain our ability to understand apparent contradictions.    
 Perhaps the most often cited example of evidence for the existence of mental 
spaces comes from Fauconnier (1994:12):  “In Len’s painting, the girl with blue eyes 
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has green eyes."  In order to understand this example, it is necessary to invoke two 
mental spaces, one containing the elements of reality (as the speaker perceives it) and 
another containing the elements of the portrait that is set up by the adverbial space 
builder in Len’s painting.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  "In Len’s paining, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes".   
 
 The large circles in Figure 4 represent mental spaces.  Structure from the parent 
space or the base space is transferred into the new space by default and so space 
building typically goes unnoticed. This is known as the access principle or the ID 
principle (Fauconnier 2005:  3).  In this example, however, there is a mismatch 
between the structure in the parent space and the new space, highlighting the 
existence of the mental spaces.  The girl in the painting is the same girl as in the 
speaker’s reality, but the colour of her eyes in the reality space is different from their 
colour in the portrait space.   
Fauconnier (1994) further proposes the existence of various types of mental 
space:  time space (e.g. in 1929) space space (e.g. in Moldova), domain space (e.g. in 
Canadian football) and hypothetical space (e.g. if P then Q).  If mental space building 
is a fundamental aspect of cognitive processing that is therefore not specific to 
language and if social knowledge is as much an aspect of the knowledge of an 
individual speaker as linguistic knowledge, then surely we must be able to posit the 
existence of social space, a mental space construction that models the individual’s 
conceptualisation of themselves and their place in society.  The concept of social 
space is certainly psychologically plausible (or at least no less psychologically 
plausible than any other type of mental space) and the term is, in fact, already used by 
Hudson (1996:  11), who argues that society is structured in cognition as a 
“multidimensional space” and that we can choose to locate ourselves along various 
dimensions within it.    
Mental spaces are created by abstracting over experiences in interaction and 
they are structured around domains
10
.  For instance, within the domain of ‘boxing’, 
Fauconnier (2005:  3) explains that a mental space may be organised by the specific 
domain (e.g. boxing) or by a more generic domain (e.g. fighting) or by an even more 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A = girl 
B = eyes 
C = colour 
Blue Green 
Speaker’s real world 
mental space 
 
BASE SPACE 
Speaker’s portrait mental 
space 
 
NEW SPACE 
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generic domain (e.g. competition).  Similarly, the individuals in this study may profile 
their social network against the very specific domain of the West Fife High School 
Pipe Band or against the more generic West Fife High School or against an even more 
generic domain of the piping community (as well as a variety of other social domains 
that may be relevant for these individuals).   
Each individual may recognise different members of the group as more salient 
in their own conception of the network for different reasons (perhaps because they 
feel connected by a positive or a negative link).  These salient individuals constitute 
the figure of the social space, where the figure in a scene is the CG term for the 
substructure perceived as standing out from the remainder of the scene, which 
constitutes the ground (Langacker 1987:120).  Each individual is aware of the 
existence of others in the network (because they are aware of who is and who is not a 
member of this band), but these other individuals may not be particularly prominent in 
some speakers’ mental picture of the group and so they constitute the ground.   
 It is also owing to some kind of salience that an entity is used as a reference 
point in CG. Reference point construction is described as “the ability to invoke the 
conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another” 
(Langacker 1999:173).  Cognitive reference points are salient entities that the 
individual can use to locate non-salient entities in the world. The individuals which 
hold some salience in the speaker’s cognitive network are therefore likely to function 
as cognitive reference points, landmarks in cognition that the speaker can invoke 
relative to which he can locate others and position himself within the multi-
dimensions of social space.   
The main difference between the social space model and a typical social 
network analysis is that the social space model recognises that social relationships are 
mental constructs and are therefore dynamic structures that exist in the mind of the 
individual.  As such, it has the capacity to explain sociolinguistic variation between 
speakers because it can question how speakers make associations in cognition 
between social knowledge and linguistic knowledge.  In other words, it can allow us 
to question how speakers give social meaning to linguistic variants at the most local 
level of analysis possible – the mind of the individual.    
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.  In section 1, I argue that 
we perceive certain linguistic variants to be linked to other linguistic variants in 
cognition by categorisation networks.  In section 2, I explain that we also perceive the 
individuals we encounter in society to be linked to ourselves and to other individuals 
in similar ways.  However, in a network model of cognition such as CG, there is no 
clear dichotomy between linguistic and non-linguistic concepts.  There is therefore no 
need to separate linguistic and non-linguistic nodes in this model.  Through the 
repeated co-activation of particular nodes and links in the network, speakers come to 
abstract relationships of similarity between certain linguistic variants (such as those of 
the (t) variable) and certain individuals or types of individuals (e.g. commentators, 
friends, enemies) in their cognitive network.  All of this information then enables the 
speaker to build up a prototype and extract a schema of a particular social type that 
includes both linguistic and social knowledge.   
 The main argument proposed in this paper is therefore that social networks and 
cognitive networks are not just similar network models; they may, in fact, be exactly 
the same cognitive structures.  If this is the case then social networks are simply 
another sub-network of knowledge that are ultimately linked to other aspects of 
knowledge, some of which happens to be more directly ‘linguistic’ in nature. 
Furthermore, the concept of social space is both psychologically plausible and 
theoretically important, because it offers linguistic theory a way of modelling social 
 10 
structures that are relevant to individual speakers and not the abstract sociograms that 
are proposed by social network analysis. 
 Given the psychological evidence for the existence of network structures in the 
human mind, this conclusion may seem unsurprising, yet it is a conclusion that is very 
rarely drawn.  As Hudson (1986) explains, little interaction exists between the 
disciplines of cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics, despite the obvious common 
ground they share.  The majority of those working in cognitive linguistics (and related 
disciplines such as neuro-linguistics) still fail to articulate the importance of the social 
aspects of language use.  Despite invoking models that are designed to incorporate 
social knowledge and sociolinguistic variation, cognitive linguistics continues to 
retain a traditional focus on language structure at the expense of language use 
(Geeraerts 1995: 115).     
 The work presented here shows that it is not only possible but beneficial to 
incorporate both social and linguistic information within the same theoretical 
framework and that there is a need to recognise the importance of such a synthesis.  
Of course, there remains a series of questions regarding the precise nature of the 
network I have proposed.    For instance, what exactly is the nature of the 
phonological nodes and on what basis do speakers perceive similarity between 
instances?  The key to answering these questions, it seems, lies in the combination of 
sociolinguistic and psychological methods of data collection and cognitive linguistic 
methods of analysis.   
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Cognitive Linguistics is the general cover term given to a range of theoretical approaches in modern 
linguistics such as Word Grammar (Hudson 1984, 1990), Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 1995) and 
Stratificational Grammar (Lamb 1999).  These approaches differ at the level of specific detail but they 
all take a fundamentally non-modular view of language. 
3  
These data form part of the corpus collected for Clark (2005).  This was a pilot study that was 
conducted for an MSc dissertation with the intention of expanding the research into a larger PhD 
project.   
4  
This assumption is based entirely on qualitative observations of parents’ occupations (e.g. police 
officer, fork-lift driver, contractor, technician, plumber etc.), the schools the adolescents attended (Kath 
is the only member of the group to attend a fee-paying school); and the socio-economic characteristics 
of the area – this particular area of West Fife, where most of the adolescents live, was the least 
expensive place to buy property in Britain in 2003 (http://www.hbosplc.com/economy/includes/01-01-
04-scottishwinnersandlosers.doc).  No attempt was made to assign these speakers to a social class 
index.   
5
  It is generally accepted as practice in sociolinguistics to enclose sociolinguistic variables (i.e. 
collections of variants that pattern in accordance with particular social and linguistic factors) in 
rounded brackets and variants of these variables in square brackets.  
6
  This measurement of phonological variation was felt to be sufficient for the purposes of this pilot 
study because the variants of this variable are, at least auditorially, discrete consonantal alternations. 
7
  This latter variant (discussed by Carr (1991) in Tyneside as TR weakening) occurred sporadically 
and very infrequently. 
8
 This explanation is slightly oversimplified because it does not consider syllable structure.  The medial 
stop in e.g. butter is much more likely to be glottalised than the medial stop in e.g. tattoo because the 
stop in tattoo is foot initial and, as Trousdale (2002:273) explains, textbook accounts of glottaling in 
English (which are based primarily on RP) suggest that t-glottaling is not possible word- or foot 
initially. However, (as in Trousdale 2002: 273 and Docherty et al. 1997: 290) there are instances in 
these data that do not confirm this generalisation.  For example, with the exception of Kath, all 
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speakers display variation between the glottal and the alveolar realisations word initially in the lexical 
item tae (the Scots form of ‘to’) and also word medially in, for example, fourteen. 
9
 Docherty et al. (1997:  300) note the apparent stylistic function for some speakers to use the “fully 
released variant to mark emphatic stress”. 
10
 Fauconnier uses the term frames, introduced by Fillmore (1982), which is similar to the notion of 
domains in CG.  I use the term domains to avoid confusion in the terminology. 
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